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ABSTRACT
Reciprocity is an important feature of human social interaction
and underpins our cooperative nature. What is more, simple forms
of reciprocity have proved remarkably resilient in matrix game
social dilemmas. Most famously, the tit-for-tat strategy performs
very well in tournaments of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Unfortunately
this strategy is not readily applicable to the real world, in which
options to cooperate or defect are temporally and spatially extended.
Here, we present a general online reinforcement learning algorithm
that displays reciprocal behavior towards its co-players. We show
that it can induce pro-social outcomes for the wider group when
learning alongside selfish agents, both in a 2-player Markov game,
and in 5-player intertemporal social dilemmas. We analyse the
resulting policies to show that the reciprocating agents are strongly
influenced by their co-players’ behavior.
1 INTRODUCTION
Sustained cooperation among multiple individuals is a hallmark of
human social behavior, and may even underpin the evolution of our
intelligence [15, 48]. Often, individuals must sacrifice some personal
benefit for the long-term good of the group, for example to manage
a common fishery or provide clean air. Logically, it seems that such
problems are insoluble without the imposition of some extrinsic
incentive structure [42]. Nevertheless, small-scale societies show a
remarkable aptitude for self-organization to resolve public goods
and common pool resource dilemmas [43]. Reciprocity provides
a key mechanism for the emergence of collective action, since it
rewards for pro-social behavior and punishes for anti-social acts.
Indeed, it is a common norm shared by diverse societies [6, 7, 44,
55]. Moreover, laboratory studies find experimental evidence for
conditional cooperation in public goods games; see for example
[13].
By far the most well-known model of reciprocity is Rapoport’s
Tit-for-Tat [47]. This hand-coded algorithm was designed to com-
pete in tournaments where each round consisted of playing the
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game against an unknown opponent.
The algorithm cooperates on its first move, and thereafter mimics
the previous move of its partner, by definition displaying perfect
reciprocity. Despite its simplicity, Tit-for-Tat was victorious in the
tournaments [1, 2]. Axelrod [3] identified four key features of the
Tit-for-Tat strategy which contributed to its success, which later
successful algorithms such as win-stay lose-shift [39] also share:
• Nice: start by cooperating.
• Clear: be easy to understand and adapt to.
• Provocable: retaliate against anti-social behavior.
• Forgiving: cooperate when faced with pro-social play.
Later, we will think of these as design principles for models of
reciprocity.
Although Tit-for-Tat and its variants have proved resilient to
modifications in the matrix game setup [8, 14, 40], it is clearly
not applicable to realistic situations. In general, cooperating and
defecting require an agent to carry out complex sequences of actions
across time and space, and the payoffs defining the social dilemma
may be delayed. More sophisticated models of reciprocity should
be applicable to the multi-agent reinforcement learning domain,
where the tasks are defined as Markov games [35, 50], and the
nature of cooperation is not pre-specified. In this setting, agents
must learn both the high-level strategy of reciprocity and the low
level policies required for implementing (gradations of) cooperative
behavior. An important class of such games are intertemporal social
dilemmas [25, 45], in which both individual rationality is at odds
with group-level outcomes and the negative impact of individual
greed is temporally distant from its adverse consequences for the
group.
[30, 33, 46] propose reinforcement learning models for 2-agent
problems, based on a planning approach. Both models first pre-
train cooperating and defecting policies using explicit knowledge
of other agents’ rewards. The policies are then used as options
in hand-coded meta-policies. The main variation between these
approaches is the algorithm for switching between these options. In
[33] and [30], the decision about which policy is chosen in response
to the last action, and that action is assessed through planning. In
[46], the decision is based on the recent rewards of the agent, which
defects if it is not doing sufficiently well. Thesemodels of reciprocity
are important stepping stones, but have some important limitations.
Firstly, reciprocity imitates a range of behaviors, rather than 2
pre-determined ones (pure cooperation and pure defection), which
are not obviously well-defined in general. Secondly, reciprocity is
applicable beyond the 2-player case. Thirdly, reciprocity does not
necessarily rely on directly observing the rewards of others. Finally,
reciprocity can be learned online, offering better scalability and
flexibility than planning.
We propose an online-learning model of reciprocity which ad-
dresses these limitations while still significantly outperforming
selfish baselines in the 2-player setting. Our setup comprises two
types of reinforcement learning agents, innovators and imitators.
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Both innovators and imitators are trained using the A3C algorithm
[38] with the VTrace correction [16]. An innovator optimizes for a
purely selfish reward. An imitator has two components: (1) a mech-
anism for measuring the level of sociality of different behaviors and
(2) an intrinsic motivation [11] for matching the sociality of others.
We investigate two mechanisms for assessing sociality. The first is
based on hand-crafted features of the environment. The other uses
a learned “niceness network”, which estimates the effect of one
agent’s actions on another agent’s future returns, hence providing
a measure of social impact [32]. The niceness network also encodes
a social norm among the imitators, for it represents “a standard
of behavior shared by members of a social group” [41]. Hence our
work represents a model-based generalization of [49] to Markov
games.
An innovator’s learning is affected by the reciprocity displayed
by imitators co-training in the same environment. The innovator
is incentivized to behave pro-socially, because otherwise its anti-
social actions are quickly repeated by the group, leading to a bad
payoff for all, including the innovator. With one innovator and one
imitator, the imitator learns to respond in a Tit-for-Tat like fashion,
which we verify in a dyadic game called the Coins dilemma [46].
For one innovator with many imitators, the setup resembles the
phenomenon of pro-social leadership [18, 22]. Natural selection
favours altruism when individuals exert influence over their fol-
lowers; we see an analogous effect in the reinforcement learning
setting.
More specifically, we find the presence of imitators elicits socially
beneficial outcomes for the group (5 players) in both the Harvest
(common pool resource appropriation) and Cleanup (public good
provision) environments [25]. We also quantify the social influence
of the innovator on the imitators by training a graph network [5] to
predict future actions for all agents, and examining the edge norms
between the agents, just as in [53]. This demonstrates that influ-
ence of the innovator on the imitator is greater than the influence
between other pairs of agents in the environment. Moreover, we
find that the innovator’s policies return to selfish free-riding when
we continue training without reciprocating imitators, showing that
reciprocity is important for maintaining stability of a learning equi-
librium. Finally, we demonstrate that the niceness network learns
an appropriate notion of sociality in the dyadic Coins environment,
thereby inducing a tit-for-tat like strategy.
2 AGENT MODELS
We use two types of reinforcement learning agent, innovators and
imitators. Innovators learn purely from the environment reward.
Imitators learn to match the sociality level of innovators, hence
demonstrating reciprocity. We based the design of the imitators on
Axelrod’s principles, which in our language become:
• Nice: imitators should not behave anti-socially at the start
of training, else innovators may not discover pro-sociality.
• Clear: imitationmust occurwithin the timescale of an episode,
else innovators will be unable to adapt.
• Provocable: imitators must reciprocate anti-social behavior
from innovators.
• Forgiving: the discount factor with which anti-social behav-
ior is remembered must be less than 1.
Note that imitating the policy of another agent overmany episodes
is not sufficient to produce cooperation. This type of imitation does
not change behaviour during an episode based on the other agent’s
actions, and so does not provide feedback which enables the in-
novators to learn. We validate this in an ablation study. As such
our methods are complementary to, but distinct from the extensive
literature on imitation learning; see [26] for a survey.
Moreover, observe that merely training with collective reward
for all agents is inferior to applying reciprocity in several respects.
Firstly collective reward suffers from a lazy agent problem due to
spurious reward [51]. Secondly, it produces agent societies that
are exploitable by selfish learning agents, who will free-ride on
the contributions of others. Finally, in many real-world situations,
agents do not have direct access to the reward functions of others.
2.1 Innovator
The innovator comprises a deep neural network trained to generate
a policy from observations using the asynchronous advantage actor-
critic algorithm [38] with V-Trace correction for stale experience
[16]. For details of the architecture, see Appendix A.
2.2 Imitator
We use two variants of the imitator. The difference is in what is
being imitated. Themetric-matching imitator imitates a hand-coded
metric. The niceness network imitator instead learns what to imitate.
The metric-matching variant allows for more experimenter control
over the nature of reciprocity, but at the expense of generality.
Moreover, this allows us to disentangle the learning dynamicswhich
result from reciprocity from the learning of reciprocity itself, a
scientifically useful tool. On the other hand, the niceness network
can readily be applied to any multi-agent reinforcement learning
environment with no prior knowledge required.
2.2.1 Reinforcement learning. Imitators learn their policy using
the same algorithm and architecture as innovators, with an addi-
tional intrinsic reward to encourage reciprocation. Consider first
the case with 1 innovator and 1 imitator; the general case will follow
easily. Let the imitator have trajectory Tim, and the innovator has
trajectory Tinv. Then the intrinsic reward is defined as
rint(t) = −(N (Tim) − N (Tinv))2 , (1)
where N (T ) is some function of the trajectory, which is intended
to capture the effect of the actions in the trajectory on the return
of the other agent. We shall refer to N (T ) as the niceness of the
agent whose trajectory is under consideration. This intrinsic reward
is added to the environment reward. We normalize the intrinsic
reward so that it accounts for a proportion cim of the total absolute
reward in each batch:
r (t) = renv(t) + cim rint(t)
µ(rint) , (2)
where the mean is taken over a batch of experience and cim is
a constant hyperparameter, which we tuned separately on each
environment.
Generalizing to the case of 1 innovator with M imitators is sim-
ple: we merely apply the intrinsic reward to each imitator sepa-
rately, based on the deviation between their niceness and that of
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the innovator. Since our method uses online learning, it automat-
ically adapts to the details of multi-agent interaction in different
environments. This is difficult to capture in planning algorithms,
because the correct cooperative policy for interactions with one
agent depends on the policies of all the other agents.
The two imitator variants differ primarily in the choice of the
niceness function N (·), as follows.
2.2.2 Metric matching. For the metric-matching imitator, we
hand-code N (T ) for trajectories in each environment in a way that
measures the pro-sociality of an agent’s behavior. If these metrics
are accurate, this should lead to robust reciprocity, which gives us
a useful comparison for the niceness network imitators.
2.2.3 Niceness network. The niceness network estimates the
value of the innovator’s states and actions to the imitator. Let V (t)
be the discounted return to the imitator from time t . We learn
approximations to the following functions:
V πinv (s invt ) = E(V (t)|s invt ) ,
Qπinv (s invt ,ainvt ) = E(V (t)|s invt ,ainvt ) ,
where s invt and ainvt are the state and action of the innovator at
time t . Clearly this requires access to the states and actions of the
innovator. This is not an unreasonable assumption when compared
with human cognition; indeed, there is neuroscientific evidence
that the human brain automatically infers the states and actions of
others [37]. Extending our imitators to model the states and actions
of innovators would be an valuable extension, but is beyond our
scope here.
The niceness of action ainvt is defined as
nπinv (s invt ,ainvt ) = Qπinv (s invt ,ainvt ) −V πinv (s invt ) . (3)
This quantity estimates the expected increase in the discounted
return of the imitator given the innovator’s action ainvt .
Then, for a generic trajectory T = (s1,a1, . . . st ,at ) we define
the niceness of the trajectory, N πinv (T ), to be
N πinv (T ) =
t∑
i=1
γ t−inπinv (si ,ai ). (4)
ThisN πinv (T ) is used in as the functionN in calculating the intrinsic
reward 1
The parameter γ controls the timescale on which the imitation
will happen; the larger γ is, the slower the imitator is to forget. This
balances between the criteria of provocability and forgiveness.
We learn the functionsV πinv andQπinv using the TD(λ) algorithm
[52] using the innovator’s states and actions and the imitator’s
reward.
While the niceness network is trained only on the states and
actions of the innovator, in calculating the intrinsic reward it is used
for inference on both imitator and innovator trajectories. For this to
work we require symmetry between the imitator and the innovator:
they must have the same state-action space, the same observation
for a given state and the same payoff structure. Therefore our
approach is not applicable in asymmetric games. Cooperation in
asymmetric games may be better supported by indirect reciprocity
than by generalizations of Tit-for-Tat; see for example [29].
2.2.4 Off-policy correction. When calculating the intrinsic re-
ward for the niceness network imitator, we evaluate N πinv (Tim)
for the imitator’s trajectories, having only trained on trajectories
from the innovator. This is problematic if the states and actions
of Tim are drawn from a different distribution from those of Tinv.
In this case, on the trajectory Tim, we might expect that V πinv and
Qπinv would be inaccurate estimates for the effect of the imitator on
the innovator’s payoff. In other words, the flip of perspective from
innovator to imitator at inference time is only valid if the imitator’s
policy is sufficiently closely aligned with that of the innovator.
In practice, we find that applying Qπinv to Tim is particularly
problematic. Specifically if the imitator’s policy contains actions
which are very rare in the innovator’s policy, then the estimate of
Qπinv for these actions is not informative. To correct this issue, we
add a bias for policy imitation to the model. The imitator estimates
the policy of the innovator, giving an estimate πˆinv(s) for each
state s . Then we add an additional KL-divergence loss for policy
imitation,
L = cKLDKL(πim(s), πˆinv(s)) , (5)
where πim(s) is the policy of the imitator, and cKL is a constant
hyperparameter. The effect of this loss term is to penalize actions
that are very unlikely in πinv(s); these are the actions for which the
niceness network is unable to produce a useful estimate.
In our ablation study, we will demonstrate that the policy im-
itation term alone does not suffice to yield cooperation. Indeed,
our choice of terminology was based on the high-level bias for
reciprocity introduced by the niceness matching, not the low-level
policy imitation. The latter might better be thought of as an ana-
logue to human behavioral mimicry [10], which while an important
component of human social interaction [31], alone does not consti-
tute a robust means of generating positive social outcomes [20].
Empirically we find that niceness matching alone often suffices
to generate cooperative outcomes, despite the off-policy problem.
This is likely because environments contain some state-action pairs
which are universally advantageous or disadvantageous to others,
regardless of the particular policy details. Moreover, this is not a
limitation of our environments, it is a feature familiar from everyday
life: driving a car without a catalytic converter is bad for society,
regardless of the time and place. The policy imitation correction
does however serve to stabilize cooperative outcomes, a suggested
effect of mimicry in human social groups [54].
3 EXPERIMENTS
We test our imitation algorithms in three domains. The first is Coins.
This is a 2-player environment introduced in [33]. This environment
has simple mechanics, and a strong social dilemma between the
two players, similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This allows us to
study our algorithms in a setup close to the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
and make comparisons to previous work.
The other two environments are Harvest and Cleanup. These
are more complex environments, with delayed results of actions,
partial observability of a somewhat complex gridworld, and more
than two players. These environments are designed to test the main
hypothesis of this paper, that our algorithms are able to learn to re-
ciprocate in complex environments where reciprocity is temporally
extended and hard to define. We choose these two environments
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Figure 1: The Coins game. Agents are rewarded for picking
up coins, and punishedwhen the other agent picks up a coin
of their color.
because they represent different classes of social dilemma; Cleanup
is a public goods game, while Harvest is a common pool resource
dilemma.
3.1 Coins
3.1.1 Environment. We use the gridworld game Coins, intro-
duced in [33]. Here, two players move on a fully-observed 5 × 5
gridworld, on which coins of two colors periodically appear. When
a player picks up a coin of either color, they get a reward of 1. When
a player picks up a coin of the other player’s color, the other player
gets a reward of −2. The episode ends after 500 steps. The total
return is maximized when each player picks up only coins of their
own color, but players are tempted to pick up coins of the wrong
color. At each timestep coins spawn each unoccupied square with
a probability 0.005. Therefore the maximum achievable collective
return is approximately 50 in expectation, if neither agent chooses
to defect and both agents collect all coins of their own color.
In this game, the metric-matching agent uses the number of re-
cent defections as its measure of niceness N (T ). We define n(st ,at )
to be −1 if the action at picks up a coin which penalizes the other
player, and 0 otherwise. Then we define
N (T ) =
t∑
i=1
λt−in(si ,ai ). (6)
To make the environment tractable for our niceness network we
symmetrize the game by swapping the coin colors in the observation
of the innovator. This means that the value and Q functions for
the innovator can be consistently applied for the imitator. Note
that only the colors in the observation are swapped; the underlying
game dynamics remain the same, so the social dilemma still applies.
3.1.2 Results. Both the metric-matching and niceness network
imitators outperformed the greedy baseline in this environment,
reaching greater overall rewards and a larger proportion of coins
being collected by the agent which owns them (Figure 2). How-
ever, neither model was able to reach the near-perfect cooperation
achieved by the approximate Markov Tit-for-Tat algorithm [33], as
shown in Figure 3 of that paper. We do not provide a numerical
comparison, because we reimplemented the Coins environment for
this paper.
This suggests that when it is possible to pre-learn policies that
purely cooperate or defect and roll these out into the future, it is
Figure 2: Reciprocity generates pro-social outcomes in
Coins. (A) Bothmetric-matching and niceness-network vari-
ants significantly outperform the baseline, measured ac-
cording to the total payoff. (B) The metric-matching imita-
tors closely match the coin collection profile of the inno-
vator during training, driving the innovator towards pro-
sociality. No such beneficial outcome is seen for the selfish
agents. (C) The same holds for the niceness network imita-
tors.
advantageous to leverage this prior knowledge to generate pre-
cise and extreme reciprocity. One might imagine improving our
algorithm to display binary imitation behavior by attempting to
match the maximum and minimum of recent niceness, rather than
a discounted history. It would be interesting to see whether this
variant elicited more cooperative behavior from innovators.
3.2 Cleanup
3.2.1 Environment. In the Cleanup environment, the aim is to
collect apples. Each apple collected provides a reward of 1 to the
agent which collects it. Apples spawn at a rate determined by the
state of a geographically separated river. Over time, this river fills
with waste, lowering the rate of apple spawning linearly. For high
4
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Figure 3: The Cleanup and Harvest games. Agents take si-
multaneous actions in a partially observable 2D gridworld.
Rewards are obtained by eating apples, and agents may fine
each other, conferring negative utility. The games are in-
tertemporal social dilemmas: short term individual rational-
ity is at odds with the long-term benefit of the whole group.
enough levels of waste, no apples can spawn. The episode starts
with the level of waste slightly above this critical point. The agents
can take actions to clean the waste when near the river, which
provides no reward but is necessary to generate any apples. The
episode ends after 1000 steps, and the map is reset to its initial state.
For details of the environment hyperparameters, and evidence that
this is a social dilemma, see [25].
More precisely, this is a public goods dilemma. If some agents
are contributing to the public good by clearing waste from the river,
there is an incentive to stay in the apple spawning region to collect
apples as they spawn. However, if all players adopt this strategy,
then no apples spawn and there is no reward.
In this game, the metric-matching agent uses the number of
contributions to the public good as its measure of niceness—for a
given state and action, n(st ,at ) is 1 if the action at removes waste
from the river, and 0 otherwise. Then we define
N (T ) =
t∑
i=1
γ t−in(si ,ai ). (7)
3.2.2 Results. Both metric-matching and niceness network imi-
tators are able to induce pro-social behaviour in the innovator they
play alongside, greatly exceeding the return and contributions to the
public good of selfish agents (Figure 4). Niceness network imitators
come close to the final performance of metric-matching imitators,
despite having to learn online which actions are pro-social. A rep-
resentative episode from the niceness network case reveals the
mechanism by which the society solves the social dilemma. The
innovator periodically leads an expedition to clean waste, which is
subsequently joined by multiple imitators. Everyone benefits from
this regular cleaning, since many apples are made available (and
consumed) throughout the episode.
A video is available at https://youtu.be/kCjYfdVlLC8.
Figure 4: The effect of reciprocity on social outcomes
in Cleanup. (A) Collective return is higher when metric-
matching or niceness-network imitators co-learnwith a self-
ish innovator. (B) The improvement in collective return is
mediated by a greater contribution to the public good. (C)
Contributions remain reasonably equal in the imitation con-
ditions, indicating that the imitators are successfullymatch-
ing their pro-social behavior with that of the innovator.
3.3 Harvest
3.3.1 Environment. In the Harvest environment, introduced in
[45], collecting apples again provides a reward of 1. Harvested
apples regrow at a rate determined by the number of nearby apples—
the more other apples are present, the more like the apple is to
regrow on a timestep. If all the apples in a block are harvested,
none of them will ever regrow. The episode ends after 1000 steps,
and themap is reset to its initial state. For details of the environment
hyperparameters, and evidence that this is a social dilemma, see
[25].
This is a commons dilemma [21]. A selfish agent will harvest as
rapidly as possible; if the whole group adopts this approach, then
the resource is quickly depleted and the return over the episode
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is low. In order to get a high group return, agents must abstain
from harvesting apples which would overexploit the common pool
resource.
In this game, there is no clear metric of pro-sociality for the
metric-matching agent we use. The anti-social actions in this game
are taking apples with few neighbours, as this leads to the common
pool resource being depleted. The sustainability of taking a particu-
lar apple a can therefore be approximated by the number of apples
within ℓ1 distance of 2 to a, capped at 3. We call this quantity sus(a),
following an analogous definition in [27]. For a trajectory T where
an agent eats apples (a1, . . . ,ak ) in order, we define
N (T ) =
k∑
i=1
γk−i sus(ai ) . (8)
3.3.2 Results. We present our findings in Figure 5. Selfish agents
are successful near the start of training, but as they become more
efficient at collection they deplete the common pool resource ear-
lier in each episode, and collective return falls. This effect is most
obvious when examining the sustainability metric, which we define
as the average proportion of the episode that had passed when
each apple was collected. Agents which collect apples perfectly uni-
formly would achieve a sustainability of 0.5. The baseline achieves
a mere 0.1.
For niceness network imitators, we see the same pattern near
the start, where all the agents become more competent at collect-
ing apples and begin to deplete the apple pool faster. We then see
sustainability and collective return rise again. This is because the
niceness network learns to classify sustainable behaviour, generat-
ing imitators that learn to match the sustainability of innovators,
which creates an incentive for innovators to behave less selfishly.
Similarly, the experiment with metric-matching imitators enters
a tragedy of the commons early in training, before recovering to
achieve higher collective return and better sustainability than the
niceness network in a shorter period of training time. This makes
intuitive sense: by pre-specifying the nature of cooperative behav-
ior, the metric-matching imitator has a much easier optimization
problem, and more quickly demonstrates clear reciprocity to the in-
novator. The outcome is greater pro-sociality by all, and in a faster
training time. To save compute, we terminated the metric-matching
runs once they were consistently outperforming the niceness net-
work.
A representative episode from the trained agents in the niceness-
network case shows the innovator taking a sustainable path through
the apples, with imitators striving to match this. Interestingly, the
society comes relatively close to causing the tragedy of the com-
mons. Intuitively, when apples are scarce, the actions of each agent
should have a more significant effect on their co-players, leading
to a better learning signal for reciprocity.
3.4 Analysis
In this section we examine the policies learned by the models, and
the learning dynamics of the system.
3.4.1 Influence between agents. If our imitators are learning
reciprocity, the the policy of the innovator should meaningfully
A video is available at https://youtu.be/pvdMt_0RCpw.
Figure 5: The effect of reciprocity on social outcomes inHar-
vest. (A) Collective return is higher when metric-matching
or niceness-network imitators co-learn with a selfish in-
novator. (B) In the imitation conditions, the group learns
a more sustainable strategy. (C) Equality remains high
throughout training, suggesting that the imitators are suc-
cessfully matching the cooperativeness of innovators.
influence the behavior of the imitators at the end of training. We
demonstrate this for the Cleanup environment, by learning a Graph-
Net model that indirectly measures time-varying influence between
entities [53]. In Cleanup, the entities of interest are agents, waste
and apples.
The input to our model is a complete directed graph with entities
as nodes. The node features are the positions of each entity and
additional metadata. For waste and apples, the metadata indicates
whether the entity has spawned. For agents, it contains orientation,
last action and last reward, and a one-hot encoding of agent type
(innovator or imitator). In addition, the graph contains the timestep
as a global feature.
The model is trained to predict agent actions from recorded
gameplay trajectories. The architecture is as follows: the input is
processed by a GraphNet encoder block with 64-unit MLPs for its
6
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Experiment In-Im Im-In Im-Im In-In
A3C — — — 0.27
Metric matching, 4 A3C 0.97 0.30 0.28 —
Niceness network, 4 A3C 0.35 0.21 0.22 —
Table 1: Edge norms for graph net models trained to predict
future states and actions. For metric-matching and niceness
network imitators, we see that the influence of the innova-
tors on imitators is greater than for any other pair of agent
types.
edge, node and global nets followed by independent GRU units
for the edge, node and global attributes with hidden states of size
32, and finally a decoder MLP network for the agent nodes with
layer sizes (32, 32, 12). Importantly, the graph output of the GRU is
identical in structure to that of the input.
In [53], it was shown that the GRU output graph contains infor-
mation about relationships between different entities. More pre-
cisely, the norm of the state vector along the edge from entity A to
entity B computes the effective influence of A on B, in the sense
of Granger causality [19]. We may use this metric to evaluate the
degree of reciprocity displayed by imitators.
Table 1 shows the average norms of the state vectors along edges
between imitators and innovators for our different imitation mod-
els, alongside an A3C baseline. The edge norm is greatest from the
innovator to the imitator, strongly exceeding the baseline, indicat-
ing the innovator has a significant effect on the imitator’s actions.
The effect is strikingly visible when the output graph net edges are
superimposed on a representative episode with metric-matching
imitators, with thicknesses proportional to their norms.
3.4.2 Ablation. In the Cleanup environment, we examine the
performance of the model with various components of the imitator
ablated. We observe that with only the policy deviation cost, the
performance is no better than with purely selfish agents. With the
niceness network intrinsic reward, but no policy deviation cost, we
see less consistent results across random seeds for the environment
and agent (Figure 6A).
3.4.3 Instability of solution without imitation. In the Cleanup
environment, we take an innovator trained alongside four imitators,
and run several copies of it in the environment, continuing to learn.
We see that the contributions and collective reward quickly fall,
as the innovators learn to be more selfish (Figure 6B). This shows
that for this environment, reciprocity is necessary not only to find
cooperative solutions but also to sustain cooperative behaviour.
3.4.4 Predictions of niceness network. We analysed the predic-
tions of the niceness network in the Coins environment, to deter-
mine whether the imitator has correctly captured which actions of
the innovator are beneficial and harmful. We rolled out 100 episodes
using the final policies of the innovator and imitator from a run
with the niceness network. On average, we found that the nice-
ness network on average makes significantly negative predictions
A video is available at https://youtu.be/NoDbUMkBfP4. In the video, the innovator is
purple, and the imitators are sky blue, lime, rose and magenta.
Figure 6: (A) Ablating the model reduces performance. Pol-
icy imitation alone cannot resolve the social dilemma. Imita-
tion reward alone resolves the dilemma inconsistently, since
policy divergence may occur, destabilizing the niceness net-
work. (B) Imitation is necessary to maintain cooperation.
When innovators that have learned to be pro-social are co-
trained, the group outcomes quickly degrade.
(−0.35 ± 0.02) for actions which pick up the wrong coin, and near
zero predictions for both picking up one’s own coin (−0.004±0.004)
and actions which do not pick up a coin (0.007 ± 0.001).
On a more qualitative level, we display some of the predictions
of the niceness network for the first of these episodes in figure 7.
There we see that the niceness network predicts negative values
for picking up the other agent’s coins, and for actions which take
the agent nearer to such coins.
4 DISCUSSION
Our reciprocating agents demonstrate an ability to elicit coopera-
tion in otherwise selfish individuals, both in 2-player and 5-player
social dilemmas. Reciprocity, in the form of reciprocal altruism [56],
is not just a feature of human interactions. For example, it is also
thought to underlie the complex social lives of teleost fish [9]. As
such, it may be of fundamental importance in the construction of
next generation social learning agents that display simple collective
intelligence [57]. Moreover, combining online learned reciprocity
with the host of other inductive biases in the multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning literature [17, 28, 34, 36, 46] may well be important
for producing powerful social agents.
In the 5-player case, our experiments place the innovator in the
leadership role, giving rise to pro-sociality. An obvious extension
would involve training several imitators in parallel, leading to a
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Figure 7: The niceness network accuratelymeasures the pro-
sociality of different actions taken by the innovator. In this
example, we see two consecutive frames from a test episode.
The innovator (dark blue) starts two steps away from the im-
itator’s coin (light blue). TheQ-value for each action is indi-
cated on each frame. It is lowest for actions that move the
innovator closer to the coin (bold), and highest for actions
that move the innovator away from the coin.
situation more akin to conformity; see for example [12]. In this case,
all individuals change their responses to match those of others. A
conformity variant may well be a better model of human behavior
in public goods games [4], and hence may generalize better to
human co-players.
It is instructive to compare our model to the current state-of-
the-art planning-based approach, approximate Markov Tit-for-Tat
(amTFT) [33]. There, reciprocity is achieved by first learning co-
operative and defecting policies, by training agents to optimize
collective and individual return respectively. The reciprocating
strategy uses rollouts based on the cooperative policy to classify
actions as cooperative or defecting, and responds accordingly by
switching strategy in a hard-coded manner.
In the Coins environment, amTFT performs significantly better
than both our niceness network and metric-matching imitators,
solving the dilemma perfectly. We believe is because it better fulfills
Axelrod’s clarity condition for reciprocity. By switching between
two well-defined strategies, it produces very clear responses to
defection, which provides a better reinforcement learning signal
driving innovators towards pro-sociality.
On the other hand, our model is more easily scalable to complex
environments. We identify three properties of an environment
which make it difficult for amTFT, but which do not stop our model
from learning to reciprocate.
(1) If no perfect model of the environment exists, or rolling out
such a model is infeasible, one must evaluate the coopera-
tiveness of others online, using a learned model.
(2) The cooperative strategy for amTFT is learned on collective
return. For games with multiple agents, this may not yield
a unique policy. For example, in the Cleanup environment,
the set of policies maximizing collective return involve some
agents cleaning the river, while other eat apples.
(3) If cooperation and defection are nuanced, rather than binary
choices, then to reciprocate you may need to adjust your
level of cooperativeness to match that of your opponent.
This is hard to achieve by switching between a discrete set
of strategies.
This leaves open an important question: how do we produce
reciprocity which is both clear and scalable to complex tasks? One
approach would be combining a model like ours, which learns what
to reciprocate, with a method which switched between policies in
a discrete fashion, as in the previous planning-based approaches
of [30, 33, 46]. This might lead reciprocity algorithms which can
be learned in complex environments, but which are clearer and so
can induce cooperation in co-players even more strongly than our
model.
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A HYPERPARAMETERS
In all experiments, for both imitators and innovators, the network
consists of a single convolutional layer with 6 output channels,
a 3 × 3 kernel and stride 1, followed by an two-layer MLP with
hidden sizes 32, an LSTM [24] with hidden size 32 and linear output
layers for the policy and baseline. The discount factor for the return
is set to 0.99, and the learning rate and entropy cost were tuned
separately for each model-environment pair.
The architecture for the niceness network is a non-recurrent
neural network with the same convnet and MLP structure as the
reinforcement learning architecture (though the weights are not
shared between the two). The output layer of the MLP is mapped
linearly to give outputs for V πinv (s), Qπinv (s,a) for each possible
action, and πˆinv(s,a) for each possible action.
For the niceness network, we used a separate optimizer from
the RL model, with a separate learning rate. Both optimizers used
the RMSProp algorithm [23]. The hyperparameters used in each
experiment are shown in Table 2.
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Hyperparameter Coins (MM) Coins (AN) Cleanup (MM) Cleanup (AN) Harvest (MM) Harvest (AN)
cim - imitation reward weight 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.1 3.0 0.1
γ - imitation memory decay 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
cKL - policy imitation weight – 0.03 – 0.1 – 0.1
Entropy weight 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
RL learning rate 0.0005 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0001
Advantage network learning rate – 0.001 – 0.0001 – 0.0001
Advantage network TD-λ – 0.9 – 0.95 – 0.95
Advantage network discount factor – 0.9 – 0.99 – 0.99
Table 2: Hyperparameters used in metric matching and advantage network imitation experiments.
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